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Jeffrey A. Frankel 
The internationalization of  equity markets encompasses the intersection of 
three important trends. The first trend is relevant even to the United States, 
where, as in the United Kingdom, equity markets have long been a dominant 
part of  the financial system. Here the trend is increasing integration with the 
rest of  the world, as American investors look abroad, foreign investors buy 
U.S.  equities, and prices on the New York Stock Exchange become increas- 
ingly linked with those in London, Tokyo, and around the world. By 1993, for 
example, American holdings of foreign stocks had reached $210 billion, more 
than double the level of  1990. 
The second trend is particularly relevant to countries such as Japan, Ger- 
many, and France, where equity markets have not in the past been as developed 
or active. It is securitization, defined as increased reliance of the financial sys- 
tem on markets in equities and bonds at the expense of banks and other finan- 
cial intermediaries.  In 1989,  the capitalization of the stock market in Japan, for 
example, surpassed that of the U.S. market.' World stock market capitalization 
for developed countries exceeded $10 trillion in 1991, quadruple the nominal 
level of ten years earlier. 
The third trend is particularly relevant to newly industrializing countries, 
though it, like the first two trends, can also be identified with other sorts of 
countries. It is the opening of national financial systems to international finan- 
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1. The crossover appears to have occurred earlier, if  one does not adjust the Japanese stock 
market for cross-holdings. Using either basis of  comparison, the U.S.  market regained the lead 
soon thereafter. 
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cia1 flows and institutions, as governments remove capital controls and other 
barriers. Foreign holdings of equities in emerging markets have been estimated 
to have  risen as high as $160 billion by  the end of  1993, compared to only 
$2 billion seven years earlier. Part of this phenomenal rate of growth is attribut- 
able to large increases in market prices. New purchases of equities from devel- 
oping countries are still smaller than the volume of gross flows among industri- 
alized countries. They are bound, however, to play an increasingly important 
role in the financial development of the recipient countries.’ 
An  increasingly integrated, securitized, and open world  financial system 
suggests important questions, and offers a rich set of  data with which to at- 
tempt to answer them. Some of  these questions are new  ones raised by  the 
international environment itself. What are the gains to international diversifi- 
cation, for example, from the viewpoint of a U.S.  investor? To what extent are 
markets in fact now integrated across countries? Do investors still exhibit an 
unexplained home-country bias, despite the degree of  globalization that has 
taken place? What is the role of  the specific times and locations around the 
world at which stocks are traded? 
Other questions are versions of questions of longstanding interest in the con- 
text of  domestic equity markets. Are the markets efficient? Are expected re- 
turns determined in world markets by  variances, covariances, and the price of 
risk as suggested by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)? If  not, what is 
the correct alternative model? To answer these questions we will also have to 
ask, What is the appropriate international version of  the CAPM, or of other 
models of asset pricing that have been developed in the domestic context? 
Most less-developed countries have previously been “financially repressed” 
and partially closed off from world financial markets. What are the effects 
when such countries liberalize and open up to foreign investors? Do the theo- 
retical gains from trade across time and across states of nature in fact show up 
in the data? How can one disentangle the extent to which fundamental shocks 
in such economies are independent of those in industrialized economies (offer- 
ing a valuable opportunity for diversification)  and the extent to which barriers 
continue to segment the markets? Have country funds offered an effective first 
wedge into markets where barriers still prevent foreign investors from enter- 
ing freely? 
These are some of the questions this volume seeks to address. Many of them 
have  until recently been underexplored, sufficiently so that it is possible to 
make relatively tangible progress. 
2. Claessens and Rhee (chap. 5 in this volume) give some figures for 1989-1992. A third of the 
flow over the four-year period took place via country funds. 3  Introduction 
Part I: Asset Pricing and Home-Country Bias in Internationally 
Integrated Markets 
Limitations of the Existing Literature 
Models of equity pricing have been the centerpiece of the finance field over 
the last twenty-five years. The literature has continued to develop rapidly in a 
technical sense. Such innovations as allowing variation over time in first and 
second moments of returns (that is, in expected rates of return, variances, and 
covariances) are very important if one hopes to be able to capture a world of 
changing realities. In other respects, however,  the research has not entirely 
kept pace with some of  the major phenomena in world markets that need to 
be addressed. 
Two  shortcomings of  standard tests of  asset-pricing models have  been 
known for a long time, but have become even more important as equity mar- 
kets have become internationalized.  More than fifteen years ago, Richard Roll 
(1977) emphasized the importance in tests of the CAPM of using as compre- 
hensive a set of assets as possible. Today, a majority of  tests conducted by 
American researchers leave out other countries’ assets entirely. Other tests con- 
ducted by  international financial economists often commit the symmetric sin 
of concentrating on a sample of countries’ bonds, either omitting equities en- 
tirely or else simply adding a single equity index such as the Standard and 
Poor’s 500 to the list of  assets. Both approaches blithely omit categories of 
assets that are some of the most important in world markets. 
A second shortcoming of the standard tests is that they usually measure all 
returns in terms of dollars. The implicit assumption is that any asset whose 
return is fixed in terms of dollars, such as U.S. deposits, is completely safe, 
and that the risk of other assets can be measured by their correlation with the 
market basket return expressed in dollars. If U.S. investors were the only ones 
whose behavior mattered, this assumption would not be too bad at short hori- 
zons. Because monthly variability in the U.S. consumer  price index is so low- 
compared to the variability in the prices of  stocks, bonds, and foreign ex- 
change-the  real value of dollar deposits is almost certain at a horizon of one 
month or less, from the viewpoint of American investors. 
U.S. investors, however, are not the only ones in the market, either the mar- 
ket for U.S. stocks or the market for foreign stocks. Just as American investors 
find dollar assets less risky than deutsche mark or yen assets, so do Japanese 
investors find yen assets less risky and German residents find mark assets less 
risky. If major stock markets are integrated, then the behavior of each national- 
ity of  investors who participate in this integrated global market is relevant. 
More precisely, in market equilibrium, each investor nationality should be 
weighted by the size of its total portfolio. The weight has been shifting away 
from U.S. investors. Because U.S. assets abroad are now exceeded by foreign- 
ers’ assets in the United States, it would be more correct to oversimplify by 4  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
assuming that the representative global investor in world markets is a foreign 
resident, than to continue with the old oversimplification of assuming that the 
representative investor is an American. There is no need, however, for either 
sort of oversimplification. 
If  purchasing  power parity  (PPP) held  among currencies,  the proper test 
would be a simple matter of identifying the price index of the appropriate inter- 
national basket of goods consumed by investors, and measuring asset returns 
in terms of it.3 PPP does not hold in the short run, however, not even approxi- 
mately. Thus, using a single composite international price index is not much 
better than using a dollar price index. There is little way around letting invest- 
ors of different countries behave differently. We will use the phrase “preferred 
local habitat” to refer to the implication that follows from this failure of PPP: 
the proposition that investors who live in different countries will use different 
reference currencies to evaluate what is a safe asset and what is a risky asset. 
More than fifteen years after these points were first emphasized,“ very few 
modern tests of international asset pricing seriously address them. This refusal 
by most researchers to allow investors to live in whatever country they choose 
seems rather intolerant. 
Other kinds of heterogeneity  of investors  across countries  are possible as 
well. One can allow investors  to have different  degrees  of risk  aversion, as 
in Charles Engel’s contribution  to this volume (chap. 3),  or to have different 
expectations  regarding  stock market performance,  as in French and Poterba 
(1991).  These extensions  are probably  of  a  lower  priority,  however,  than 
allowing for differences in the consumption basket, 
International Factors and Rates of Return 
The state-of-the-art  work of  Campbell  Harvey  (1989, 1991, 1993), alone 
and together with Wayne Ferson (1993,  1994), addresses some serious short- 
comings of the previous literature. It allows expected returns to vary over time 
by conditioning  them on a set of observable instrumental  variables, such as 
dividend yields. It also allows variances to vary over time, for example, by 
means of the famous ARCH process introduced by  Robert Engle and devel- 
oped in subsequent elaborations,  such as Bollerslev, Engle, and Wooldridge 
(1988). In the technique of Harvey (1991), variances and covariances are also 
allowed to vary in a general way  (somewhat analogously to the way  first mo- 
ments are allowed to vary in a completely unrestricted way in the method used 
by Charles Engel). 
3. A classic reference that follows this approach is Grauer, Litzenberger, and Stehle (1976). 
4. Solnik (1977) first modeled investors in each country as caring only about returns expressed 
in their own country’s terms, because they consume no foreign goods, and domestic goods prices 
are nonstochastic. The more general framework in which investors have a borne-country bias based 
on consuption patterns (the “preferred  local habitat” model) was  developed by  Kouri and  de 
Macedo (1978), Dornbusch (1983). and Frankel (1982) in the economics literature, and Stulz 
(1981a) and Adler and Dumas (1983). a classic survey, in the finance literature. 5  Introduction 
Many researchers have sought refuge from the mundane realities of CAPM 
tests-such  as the aforementioned difficulty of measuring all assets-by  as- 
suming a world of representative agents, each of whom maximizes an (identi- 
cal) intertemporal  expected utility function. The solution is more apparent than 
real, however, as the theoretical constructs in such models are often even more 
difficult to measure empirically. Moreover, a representative agent model is 
clearly inappropriate  for addressing our second concern, explained above, het- 
erogeneity of  investors across countries. Dumas (1993) has considered the 
prospects for reconciling this model, which he calls the “orthodox general 
equilibrium approach,” with some of the stylized facts of international finance 
that concern us in this volume: PPP deviations, home bias in equity prefer- 
ences, and differences in expected returns across countries. He concludes that 
the CAPM, which he calls the “heterodox partial-equilibrium approach,” is 
more likely to accommodate these stylized facts. 
In recent work, Dumas and Solnik (1993) use instrumental variables similar 
to Harvey’s to condition expected returns, but at the same time seek to move 
beyond the assumption that all investors live in the United States, to address 
the issue of preferred local habitats. Their technique for choosing between the 
international and classical versions of  the CAPM allows the data to suggest 
whether the return on a country’s equities is determined by putting weight on 
correlations with individual currencies, or solely by  the correlation with the 
aggregate market portfolio. In chapter 1 of this volume, Bernard Dumas ex- 
tends this approach in the direction of addressing what I will call the Summers 
ketchup critique. 
Larry Summers (1985) registered a complaint with research in finance: that 
it spends all its energies testing, essentially, whether the price of  one-quart 
ketchup bottles bears the hypothesized relationship to the price of  one-pint 
ketchup bottles. Summers was refemng to the habit of testing the relationship 
between the first moment of  stock returns and the second moment of  stock 
returns, with no other data beyond stock prices entering the analysis. (One 
might add that the practice of using lagged stock returns as instrumental vari- 
ables does little to reduce the circularity.) In a study of the ketchup market, 
one would hope to explain the price of  ketchup in terms of  such factors as 
wages, the price of tomatoes, the income of consumers, the price of hamburg- 
ers, the price of  mustard, and so on. Similarly, argues Summers, one would 
hope to be able to explain stock returns in terms of fundamental  economic vari- 
ables. 
The Dumas study appearing here dispenses with the variables internal to the 
financial markets, such as dividendprice ratios, that others have relied on to 
predict returns. Instead, indicators of real economic activity are used as instru- 
mental variables: for example, housing-start authorizations,  increases in manu- 
facturing inventories, the percentage of companies reporting slower deliveries, 
and other variables found by Stock and Watson (1992) to be important in pre- 
dicting real activity. Viewed in the light of the Summers ketchup critique of 6  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
the circularity of the standard approach, the Dumas study is a commendable 
attempt to relate international equity returns to real economic variables. This 
line of  inquiry is useful even if  the real economic variables do not predict 
returns as well as the financial variables do, although one is reassured to see 
that these instruments have at least some statistical power. Dumas then tests 
the international conditional CAPM against the classic conditional CAPM and 
statistically does not reject the former. He also tests the classic conditional 
CAPM (against an unspecified alternative), and does reject it; so the reader’s 
prior beliefs regarding the CAPM will affect the way he or she wishes to inter- 
pret the findings. 
Chapter 2 in this volume consists of Wayne Ferson and Campbell Harvey’s 
latest contribution to tests of international asset pricing. They seek to bridge 
the gap between state-of-the-art finance and practitioners who engage in “asset 
allocation” based on whatever observable variables seem to be useful for pick- 
ing stocks. 
Like Adler and Dumas (1983) and Dumas and Solnik (1993), they assume 
that returns on individual assets will be related not only to the return on a world 
market portfolio (the Morgan Stanley Capital International inde~),~  but also to 
the return on holding a portfolio of G10 currencies. Ferson and Harvey inter- 
pret the two coefficients as betas, one on the world stock market portfolio and 
one on the currency portfolio, and let them vary over time as functions of cer- 
tain attributes of the national equity markets. The idea is that attributes of the 
national markets should predict the cross section of future returns only to the 
extent that differences in the attributes across countries measure differences in 
the betas. Ferson and Harvey model the betas as functions of three groups of 
attributes: (a)  valuation ratios, such as price-to-book value and price-to-cash- 
flow, (b)  industrial structure, and (c) economic performance measures, such as 
relative gross national product (GNP) growth and relative inflation. 
They test whether these betas are statistically related to expected returns on 
the assets in question, against a number of ad hoc alternative hypotheses. They 
do not, however, focus explicitly on second moments to test whether a higher 
level of risk on an asset requires a higher expected return to induce investors 
to willingly hold that asset-as  in classic tests of the CAPM. The proposition 
that predictable components of returns must be risk premia is assumed rather 
than tested.6  This approach has become the norm in models of risk.‘  As Bruce 
Lehmann notes, yesterday’s “anomalies” of predictability have become today’s 
risk premiums. (Possible alternative interpretations of predictability are con- 
sidered below, in part 11.) 
5. They cite Stulz (1984) for the conditions under which a single-beta  CAPM based on a world 
6. Harvey (1989) tests the proposition. 
7. Many researchers follow the strategy of, first, developing a complete intertemporal optimiza- 
tion theory, and then-when  it comes time to test, and the empirical counterparts of the theoretical 
“state variables” are nowhere to be found-adopting  convenient observable variables as proxies. 
market portfolio holds. 7  Introduction 
There is always a concern that a test of the CAPM is not meaningful because 
one cannot actually measure the correct benchmark portfolio. The concern has 
given rise to a tradition of adding in whatever additional factors the researcher 
thinks might be useful in explaining returns. Ferson and Harvey (1993, 1994) 
have found oil prices, industrial-country industrial production, and industrial- 
country inflation rates useful in past work, but do not get very far with them 
here. The coefficients in cross-sectional regressions of returns on lagged attri- 
butes, which should be the factor premia if  the attributes measure betas, are 
only weakly related to premiums for these global risk factors. Ferson and Har- 
vey’s tests do suggest that the attributes may be useful for modeling the world 
equity market and the currency portfolio. Findings that returns on some coun- 
tries’ stocks are related to observable economic factors will always be of inter- 
est to practitioners. 
Tests of the International CAPM and Home-Country Bias 
The contribution to this volume by Engel (and that by Linda Tesar and Ingrid 
Werner [chap.  41) tests the international CAPM with a technique that addresses 
many of the limitations of the existing literature.8  Like the state-of-the-art fi- 
nance tests, Engel’s  test in chapter 3 allows conditional expected returns to 
vary over time. Unlike these tests, however, the CASE method (Constrained 
Asset Share Estimation) does not require that the information set upon which 
investors condition their expectations be limited to a handful of variables ob- 
served by  the econometrician. Rather, investors’ expectations, regardless of 
what they are based on, can be inferred from their observed asset holdings. 
Asset stock measures do not have to be introduced extraneously; they are al- 
ready implicitly present in the standard CAPM measure of the return on the 
overall market portfolio that everyone uses, as the weights that are used to 
aggregate individual assets’ returns. 
The downside of the technique, as Engel admits, is that the second moments 
must be modeled in an ad hoc way reminiscent of how other studies model the 
first moments. Variances and covariances must be assumed either to follow 
some sort of  ARCH or GARCH process or to be related to lagged values of 
observable economic variables, if  they are not assumed constant altogether.’ 
Of course the same is true of other tests. 
8. Some of these attractions were also claimed by the tests in Frankel (1982, 1983, and 1985) 
and Frankel and Engel (1984). But the technique has in the past included only a limited set of 
assets-thus  being subject to the Roll critique. Furthermore, the four papers cited also required 
that the variances and covariances he constant over time. 
9. The GARCH  version of  the CASE method has also been tested by  Engel and Rodrigues 
(1989), and Engel, Frankel, Froot, and Rodrigues (1994). The application of  the technique by 
Giovannini and Jorion (1989) added the US.  stock market to the set of international bonds consid- 
ered in the earlier papers, and conditioned variances on the level of interest rates. Like the earlier 
papers, it rejected the CAPM hypothesis. Engel and Rodrigues (1993) included a range of coun- 
tries’ stock markets, and conditioned variances on a set of economic variables like some of the 
instrumental variables used in the Dumas (chap.  1) and Ferson-Harvey (chap. 2) contributions to 
the present volume. 8  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
A second advantage of the CASE method is that the null hypothesis of the 
international conditional CAPM is tested against interesting explicit alternative 
hypotheses. Most notably, it affords a natural test of the CAPM against the 
Tobin model in which investors balance their portfolios across assets as general 
functions of expected returns, without necessarily diversifying optimally. One 
must conclude that this particular alternative hypothesis is of more interest to 
economists than to finance specialists, however, given the gulf that appears 
between the two  strands in the literature. Other alternative hypotheses that 
one could imagine, and that are considered by other contributors to this vol- 
ume,  include market  segmentation, noise  trading, and  the  possibility  that 
ex  ante returns cannot in  finite samples reliably be  inferred from ex post 
realizations. Tests are always more interesting with an alternative hypothesis. 
A third important advantage is that Engel allows his investors to live in what- 
ever country they choose, like Dumas and Solnik (1993) but unlike most tests. 
In other words, residents of each country are allowed to have their own asset 
preferences, and their asset demands are then added up to arrive at the overall 
market equilibrium. This trick is accomplished by using cumulated data on 
countries’ current account positions, measuring their net investment positions 
vis-his each other. For example, Japan’s wealth increases at the expense of 
America’s when the former runs a current account surplus and the latter a cur- 
rent account deficit. 
One of the nested hypotheses tested by Engel, his Model 3, seeks to dispense 
with the data on national wealths by  assuming them constant and allowing 
their levels to be estimated endogenously. His Model 3 is in fact somewhat like 
the famous equation (14) of Adler and Dumas (1983), as tested, for example, 
by Dumas and Solnik (1993) or reproduced here as equation (1) in Dumas’s 
paper. (The main difference is that Dumas estimates betas in the traditional 
first step of a two-step method, while Engel imposes the CASE constraint in a 
single estimation procedure. This is a constraint of proportionality between the 
coefficients in the expected return equation, on the one hand, and the variance- 
covariance matrix of the error term in the same equation, on the other hand.) 
Engel finds that his Model 3 performs the worst of  all the models he tests. 
Evidently it is necessary to allow for the fact that countries’ shares of world 
wealth do in fact change over time. 
Engel’s results offer some relatively clear verdicts on some hypotheses that 
have been widely pondered. First, he does not reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficient of risk aversion is equal across countries (Model 2 in section 3.4  of 
chap. 3). The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is approximately 
4.0. Second, the special case of  ARCH is rejected against the more general 
GARCH. 
Especially noteworthy are the verdicts on some of the hypotheses that are 
central to the goals of this volume. There is weak evidence (that is, at approxi- 
mately the 10 percent significance level; see section 3.5 of  chap. 3) that the 9  Introduction 
international CAPM has some ability to predict expected returns.l0 Investor 
heterogeneity appears to be key to the relative success of  several versions of 
the model." Ultimately, however, Engel again rejects the CAPM, because the 
heterogeneity observed in the data is not quite of the right sort. 
Previous results have sounded negative for the international  CAPM, but they 
have been on less firm ground than Engel's. A failure to reject the hypothesis 
that expected returns are equalized internationally, within the CAPM frame- 
work, sounds like bad news for the model; but a failure to reject does not allow 
one to claim a positive finding. A rejection of CAPM against the more general 
Tobin alternative also sounds like bad news, but again is somewhat less com- 
pelling if  the Tobin alternative itself has no explanatory power for expected 
returns. By paying due attention to a full international array of assets and coun- 
tries of residence, Engel has been able to reject the constraints of the interna- 
tional CAPM in favor of  a more general alternative that has a particular claim 
on our interest. That alternative, the portfolio balance model with an allowance 
for preferred local habitats, has a particular claim on our interest because it 
seems to be the only model that has predictive power for asset returns ernpiri- 
cally, and at the same time follows from a widely used theoryI2 
Tesar and Werner in chapter 4  have a more direct way  of  addressing the 
failure of the standard tests of the CAPM to allow diversity of investor resi- 
dence. They work with data on purchases of assets from the balance of pay- 
ments capital accounts of major countries. Previous researchers have virtually 
ignored these data. Large measurement errors in the balance of payments data 
are part of the explanation. Nevertheless there is much to be learned from the 
data, even with its imperfections, and the authors are to be commended for 
undertaking this line of research. A good example of the issues that are difficult 
to analyze without the balance of payments data is precisely the hypothesis of 
optimal diversification by investors of differing nationalities. 
After exploring various patterns in the data, Tesar and Werner use the same 
technique as Engel to test the CAPM. Instead of aggregating across investors 
10. A great many researchers  have found an ability to predict expected return differentials using 
ad hoc predictors. Within the consrrainrs of  the CAPM, however, previous tests such as Frankel 
(1982) and Giovannini and Jorion (1989) have been unable to reject the hypothesis that expected 
returns are equalized across countries.  Engel suggests  that this may be due to the failure to consider 
a full set of bonds and equities, or to allow the variances to vary. 
11. Thomas and Wickens (1993) apply the CASE method to a portfolio of four countries' bonds 
and equities. They obtain a rejection of  the CAF'M,  like the earlier studes cited in notes 6 and 7 
and other applications  of the technique. Their study has all the advantages of Engel's-a  reason- 
ably complete international set of assets, time-varying variances, conditional  expected returns that 
can vary freely, an explicit test of the CAPM against an alternative hypothesis-except  that it is 
missing investor heterogeneity. 
12. Once again, the portfolio-balance theory has traditionally  been of greater interest to econo- 
mists than to finance specialists. Branson and Henderson (1985) is one survey of the portfolio 
balance model,  with emphasis on the finance perspective.  A recent example is Brainard and 
Tobin (1992). 10  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
in different countries of residence, however, they make use of their balance of 
payments data to examine the behavior of individual nationalities. In the last 
section of this paper, they concentrate on the asset demands of U.S. investors, 
due to greater data availability than for other countries. Their test is necessarily 
only a test of  mean-variance efficiency of  the portfolios held by  American 
residents, rather than a test of the interntional CAPM hypothesis; but since the 
latter hypothesis amounts to the proposition that all important investors in the 
marketplace hold portfolios characterized by  mean-variance efficiency, a test 
of Americans’ behavior is certainly a useful piece of information. Like Engel, 
they are able to reject conditional mean-variance efficiency, against the more 
general Tobin alternative. 
A major motivation for the volume, and especially for Tesar and Werner, is 
a puzzle that also seems likely to be connected with the statistical rejection of 
the  international  CAPM.  Investors  who  reside  in  different  countries  are 
thought  to exhibit a bias toward holding  home  assets. French and Poterba 
(1991), Golub (1991), and Tesar and Werner (1992) find that there is such a 
bias in portfolios actually held, notwithstanding the widely noted progress al- 
ready made in recent years toward the globalization of equity markets. (The 
data used by Tesar and Werner [I9921 for this purpose are the same sort that 
they use in their contribution to the present volume.) In  1989, U.S. investors 
reportedly held 94 percent of  their stock-market wealth in domestic stocks, 
Japanese investors held 98 percent, and U.K. investors held  82 percent. In 
1990, pension funds in G-7 countries continued to hold more than 90 percent 
of  their assets dome~tical1y.l~  Why does not each hold more of  the others’ 
equitie~?’~ 
One can readily explain a substantial home-country bias in investors’ hold- 
ings of short-term bonds, as opposed to equities. The explanation is rational 
preferences for local currency habitats. Assume a simple model of investors’ 
portfolio allocations based on one-period mean-variance optimization (which 
is the CAPM). Assume further that goods prices are predetermined in the cur- 
rency of the country where the good is produced, over a horizon as long as the 
maturity of  the bond. Calculating the optimal portfolio for a given investor, 
even approximately, is difficult because of sensitivity to expected rates of re- 
turn, which are difficult to measure precisely. calculating the dzjjierence be- 
tween optimal portfolios held by domestic and foreign residents is much easier, 
however, assuming that both share the same expectations (and, for simplicity, 
the same coefficient of risk aversion, as in Engel’s results). The reason is that 
the expectations component of the optimal portfolio share drops out of the dif- 
ference. 
13. Jorion, comment on chapter 4 in this volume. 
14.  Recent surveys by Dumas (1993) and Obstfeld (1994) each devote sections to this observed 
bias and its possible explanations. 11  Introduction 
Let x,  be the share of their portfolio that Americans allocate to U.S.  assets 
and x,  the share of their portfolios that Germans allocate to U.S.  assets. Then 
it can be shown that 
where a,  and a, are the shares of their consumption that optimally diversified 
American and German residents, respectively, allocate to U.S. goods, and p is 
the coefficient of relative risk aver~i0n.l~  Intuitively,  to the extent that investors 
are relatively risk-averse (p > l),  they differ in their portfolio preferences in 
simple proportion to how they  differ in their consumption preferences. The 
term representing the home-country bias in consumption, a,  -  a,,  is certainly 
large in practice. Assume for simplicity that it takes its maximum value of 
1 -  0 = 1. Let us try a value for the coefficient of risk aversion that emerges 
from Engel’s estimates: 4.  It follows that the measure of home country bias is 
relatively large: xA -  x, = .75. If residents of each country in fact hold a mere 
10 or 15 percent of  their portfolios in foreign bonds, that is fully consistent 
with optimal diversification (35 -  .15 = .70 < .75)! At  first glance, home- 
country bias poses no puzzle. 
The puzzle arises in a portfolio that includes equities. To a first approxima- 
tion, the return on equities is determined as a random draw in the currency of 
the home country. In other words, in practice this return has a surprisingly low 
correlation with the exchange rate. There is a substantial correlation of equity 
returns across countries; Wen-Ling Lui and Takatoshi Ito’s contribution to this 
volume (chap. 7) constitutes the latest piece of evidence on how stock market 
movements are transmitted from one country to another. The correlation is 
far from 1, however, which is of  course the reason why international equity 
investment offers a valuable opportunity to diversify. 
The key point is that exchange-rate risk is not an impediment to holding 
foreign equities in the way that it is an impediment to holding foreign bonds. 
Once investors have given vent to the home-country bias that optimally follows 
from differences in consumption patterns, in the form of bond portfolios that 
are relatively undiversified, there is little reason for their equity portfolios to 
exhibit the same home-country bias. Rather, in theory, American investors 
should take advantage of the opportunity to diversify by holding approximately 
the same amount of German equities as German residents hold. They can eas- 
ily eliminate the gratuitous exchange risk by reducing their holdings of Ger- 
man bonds correspondingly or, equivalently, by selling marks on the forward 
market. (The prescription to hold foreign equities but hedge the exchange risk 
has been recommended to portfolio managers as a “free lunch.”’6) 
15. One of  many  possible examples is Frankel (1983). equations (1) and (3). 
16. Perold and Schulman (1988). This prescription, and many  of the other conclusions that 
follow from  the  one-period mean-variance model, change if  investors are  obliged to take  into 
consideration longer horizons. See Froot (193). 12  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Clearly, investors’ equity portfolios are in fact less diversified than this. In a 
framework that allows investors of each country to diversify among countries’ 
stocks and bonds as they will, rejection of the CAPM constraint might be at- 
tributed to its implication that investors should exhibit home-country bias only 
in their bonds, not in their st0~ks.l~  Tesar and Werner, certainly, infer that there 
is a significant home-country bias puzzle-which  cannot be  explained by 
transactions costs-from  their evidence that investors trade a lot on the small 
fraction of  the portfolio that they dedicate to foreign assets. They find that 
gross transactions volumes are very large compared to the magnitude of the 
corresponding net transactions volume. 
Part 11: Emerging Markets, lkading Volume, Location, Taxes, Controls, 
and Other Imperfections 
We have seen that the tests, even those that make full allowance for the range 
of international assets to be held and the range of  countries where investors 
live, seem consistently to reject the international CAPM hypothesis. Why? 
One possibility is that investors are sophisticated and markets are efficient, but 
the CAPM does not hold because the assumptions upon which the simple one- 
period mean-variance framework depends are not justified. The alternative 
possibility is that international equity markets fall short, in one way or another, 
of the ideal of a perfectly integrated efficient market where rationally expected 
returns correctly price risk and investors are able to optimize fully. There are 
(at least) three ways that markets could fall short of the ideal, all involving an 
extra degree of heterogeneity arising from such factors as imperfect informa- 
tion. Investor heterogeneity must always be with us; otherwise it would be 
difficult to explain the high volume of transactions in the equities markets. But 
it arises more forcefully in a global context than in the domestic context. I have 
in mind an extra degree of  heterogeneity beyond the mere fact of  different 
national consumption baskets considered above. 
First, integration may still be far from perfect, due to remaining taxes, regu- 
lations, legal differences, and  imperfect  transmittal of  information across 
countries, segmenting some countries’ markets from the world market. Such 
barriers may be the explanation for observed home-country bias. Second, be- 
cause markets are not perfectly liquid, there may be a relevant dichotomy be- 
tween “liquidity traders” and “informed traders.” Third, in a world of imperfect 
information, some investors may make worse use of the available information 
than others. So-called noise traders may undergo waves of optimism or pessi- 
17. Engel tests the version of the international CAPM that does not allow any home-country 
bias in equities whatsoever, which is a particularly extreme version of the model, the Solnik form, 
in which investors are assumed to consider the home currency completely safe, because they are 
assumed to consume no foreign goods whatsoever. There is room for generalization of the test 
here to allow for some uncertainty in the investor’s home-currency consumer price index, but a 
different result seems unlikely. 13  Introduction 
mism regarding investments in particular countries. Each of these three possi- 
bilities would be a departure from the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. They each 
play a role in the second half of the volume. 
Segmentation and Emerging Markets 
Imperfect integration, as a deviation from the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, 
is a possibility even in  the case of industrialized countries.I8 Japan, for ex- 
ample, had heavy restrictions on foreign stock ownership as recently as 1979, 
and legal and information differences may  still be disinducements to cross- 
border investment. 
Imperfect integration is most evident, however, in the case of less-developed 
countries (LDCs). Many LDCs have undergone financial liberalization in re- 
cent years, spumng a boom in emerging markets. As these countries remove 
explicit barriers to cross-border investment, they incidentally provide us with 
convenient experimental data on which to try out tests of segmentation versus 
integration. This underexplored area promises much exciting research.I9 
Studies of the extent of segmentation have been challenged by the difficulty 
of  disentangling the implications of barriers to integration from the implica- 
tions of  independent economic shocks across countries. While the extent of 
independence of shocks provides an important incentive for cross-border in- 
vestments and the extent of barriers provides an important obstacle, both can 
show up empirically in the same way: as a relatively low correlation between 
emerging markets and markets in industrialized countries. One approach is to 
divide countries into  subsamples, according to  whether their markets  are 
known to be open at a particular time. Usually, however, liberalization is more 
of a gradual continuous process, rather than a one-time complete event. 
Stijn Claessens and Moon-Whoan Rhee, in chapter 5, study the process of 
opening by less-developed countries by  making use of  some interesting new 
indexes on the degree of foreign “investability” computed by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). They build on a standard test of  segmentation in 
which returns on a countries’ equities could either obey the CAPM vis-h-vis 
the world market portfolio (if the markets are integrated) or vis-21-vis the do- 
mestic portfolio alone (if markets are segmented). They reject the hypothesis 
of complete integration for ten out of sixteen countries. For most of the coun- 
tries they are not able to reject the opposite polar case of complete segmenta- 
tion. On the other hand, their results are favorable to integration for more coun- 
tries than has been the case in past studies on pre-1988 data sets, suggesting 
that the degree of integration has increased over time. 
They then test an equation in which individual  returns are determined by the 
world market beta plus the extra local portfolio beta interacted with the IFC 
18. Stulz (1981b) and Errunza and Losq (1985) are examples of the theory and testing, respec- 
19. Many of  the authors working on this subject have recently been brought together by Claes- 
tively, of segmented equity markets. 
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investability index (which runs on a scale from 0 to 1). This seems like a test 
well specified to distinguish the effects of segmentation from the inherent cor- 
relation of countres’ economic disturbances. Yet  the results are poor. Only 
when they look for an effect of the investability index on the level of price/ 
earnings ratios, as opposed to the rate of  return, do they find statistically sig- 
nificant effects: the higher a country’s degree of investability, the greater the 
effective demand for its stocks and the higher their prices. 
Claessens and Rhee suspect that the source of  their difficulty in finding 
meaningful effects on rates of  return is that ex post price changes are a very 
noisy indicator of ex ante expectations. Specifically, if a country starts off with 
some degree of  segmentation, and then liberalizes during the sample period, 
its equity prices should rise at the same time. Investors in this country will have 
experienced capital gains during the sample period, as compared to another 
country that retains a high level of capital controls throughout. The first coun- 
try shows a higher return during the sample, even though the ex ante required 
rate of return should in theory be higher in the second country. The lesson is 
that small-sample statistical tests that are implicitly based on an assumption of 
stationary structure are likely to go awry if used to study a period of structural 
change. This is an example of a failure of the rational expectations methodol- 
ogy, as distinct from the hypothesis of rational expectations or efficient mar- 
kets per se, that plagues much empirical work throughout the finance field. 
The Location and Volume of Trading 
Usually in the study of equity markets, we abstract from issues regarding 
the volume of trading and the location of the trading. It is interesting to reflect, 
however, that the volume of the day’s equity transactions in London, New York, 
or Tokyo is the economic statistic that the audience of the CNN network and 
other information outlets apparently finds one of  the most important. (Most 
reported is the day’s change in the stock market price index.) 
What determines whether a given trade takes place in one financial center 
or another? The location of the financial industry is not deeply rooted in funda- 
mentals of comparative advantage. In chapter 6, John Campbell and Kenneth 
Froot study the role of  taxes on securities transactions. They examine two 
kinds of taxes: one in effect in Sweden, which is essentially a tax on domestic 
brokerage services, and another in effect in the United Kingdom, which is a 
tax on the legal transfer of  ownership of  U.K. equities. They find that both 
kinds of taxes lead to significant responses in the form of  a fall in domestic 
trading. The response can involve either a shift of the same transactions off- 
shore (though this is not an option in the U.K.  case), a substitution into other 
similar (but untaxed) assets, or a decline in trading altogether. 
Such research naturally has important implications for the securities indus- 
try itself, and potentially for public policy as well. The motivation of countries 
with securities transactions taxes is usually simply to raise revenue. The Swed- 
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income” of  securities traders. The U.K. tax might be judged successful if  its 
goal were to reduce the volume of trading in particular U.K.  assets, for ex- 
ample, under the theory that “excessive trading” leads to “excessive  volatility.” 
Campbell and Froot conclude, however, that proposals to tax securities  transac- 
tions as a source of tax revenue are less likely to be successful, unless perhaps 
the taxes can be imposed worldwide so as to prevent traders from shifting off- 
shore. 
The transactions  tax experiment shows that relatively large shifts in the loca- 
tion of trading can result from relatively small changes in the cost of trading. 
(Similar implications presumably follow from other elements of trader costs, 
such as rents, telecommunications costs, and salaries of lawyers and transla- 
tors.) The conclusion does not rule out the possibility, however, that the loca- 
tion and volume of  trading are irrelevant to the determination of  securities 
prices, beyond the epsilon-width band of  arbitrage created by  such costs. If 
location and trading volume are to have broader implications for securities 
prices, it is likely that imperfect information will have to play a role. It is con- 
sidered below. 
Timing around the globe-for  example, the closing of  New York  markets 
at 4:OO P.M. (EST) and the opening of Tokyo markets approximately three or 
four hours later (9:30 A.M.  Japan time)-offers  a natural experiment to help 
answer a number of questions. Several researchers have noted the strengthened 
links between foreign markets and the U.S. market, particularly in the October 
1987 crash and subsequently.20  In chapter 7, Lin and Ito focus on the interrela- 
tion of price movements, volatility clusters, and trading volumes, between the 
New York and Tokyo markets. They consider trading volume a possible proxy 
for heterogeneous beliefs, since investors would not trade if all were identical. 
This study makes a contribution to the literature on correlation across markets, 
by  testing under what circumstances the correlation is higher than others. It 
also makes a contribution to the literature on trading volumes, by  testing the 
effects from one market to the next. 
Lin and Ito consider two competing hypotheses regarding correlation across 
markets. The first is that markets are imperfectly  liquid, so that when a “liquid- 
ity trader” wishes to sell a stock in a hurry, he or she is obliged to give up a 
bit of return, which goes to the other class of  traders (“informed traders”) as 
compensation. A testable implication of this hypothesis is attributed to Camp- 
bell, Grossman, and Wang (1993): that a temporary upsurge in trading volume 
should cause a temporary decrease in returns, followed by  a rebound in the 
subsequent period (i.e., negative autocorrelation).  Lin and Ito, however, after 
looking in vain for evidence that trading volume in New York has a negative 
20. For example, Eun and Shim (1989). King and Wadhwani (1990), and von Furstenberg and 
Jeon (1989). Shiller, Kon-ya, and Tsutsui (1991) conclude from a systematic study of question- 
naires that Japanese traders in the crash were responding in an immediate sense to news about 
U.S. price movements per se, not to news about economic fundamentals. 16  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
effect on the correlation between the New  York  and Tokyo markets, do not 
favor this hypothesis. 
The competing hypothesis is that Japanese traders correctly infer from New 
York price movements information that is relevant to the pricing of their own 
stocks. Lin and Ito find that the correlation across the markets goes up when 
the volatility in New York goes up, which they think may be evidence in favor 
of  this second hypothesis. It is surprising, however, that the authors find no 
evidence that volatility in Tokyo is associated with volatility in New York, as 
they have  found in earlier work on the foreign exchange market.21  There is 
room for more research on the interaction of these variables. The use of direct 
data on the dispersion of beliefs among traders, as measured by the standard 
deviation of survey responses, might help. 
Country Funds and Investor Sentiment 
Most economists and finance specialists have  long found unattractive the 
hypothesis that an important fraction of investors do not make full use of avail- 
able information. After a decade of  research into observed “anomalies” and 
some hard-to-explain upswings and crashes, however, there has recently been 
more serious consideration of the possible role of such factors as fads, bubbles, 
“noise traders,” “feedback traders,” and so on. 
Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry Wizman make a fascinat- 
ing contribution to this volume in their study of  country funds in chapter 8. 
These funds are well worth studying in their own right, as the leading wedge 
into some countries’ emerging markets. By December 1992, U.S. investors 
could buy into twenty-six countries through one or more country funds traded 
on the New  York  Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX). The funds also offer a remarkable opportunity for one of the clearest 
tests to date of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis versus the hypothesis that 
noise traders are important. 
It is always difficult to test whether the market price of a stock is equal to 
its fundamental value, because of the uncertainty regarding what is the correct 
model of the fundamental value. There is little doubt, however, that the market 
price of a fixed portfolio of equities ought to be equal to the net asset value of 
the portfolio, that is, the aggregate of the market prices of the individual stocks. 
Closed-end country funds are just such fixed portfolios, and yet  their prices 
when traded in New  York are observed to differ substantially from their net 
asset values expressed in dollars. 
Previous authors have observed the discrepancy between country funds and 
their respective net asset values.22  Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman study 
21. Engle, Ito, and Lin (1990) use the term “meteor showers” to describe volatility clusters that 
22. For example, Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, and Wheatley (1990) and  Diwan, Senbet, and 
persist, not only from one trading day to the next, but from one time zone to the next. 
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how it moves through time. To summarize briefly the outcome of a systematic 
and thorough analysis, the New York prices of country funds are observed in 
the short run to behave far more like the New York prices of other U.S. securi- 
ties than to behave like the aggregated net asset value of the individual foreign 
securities that constitute the portfolio. Specifically, when there is a fluctuation 
in the exchange rate between the dollar and the currency of the local country 
in question, the country-fund price tends in the short run to follow the dollar, 
not the local currency. When there is a fluctuation in the price of the world 
stock market, or small U.S. stocks, again the country-fund price tends in the 
short run to follow the world portfolio or the U.S. stocks, not its respective 
local national stock market. Only slowly over time does the price converge to 
the net asset value as in theory it should right away. The weekly autoregressive 
coefficient is estimated at 39, for a half-life of  five weeks. It is difficult to 
reconcile this behavior  with the hypothesis of  an  efficient and frictionless 
world capital market. 
Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman interpret the data in terms of a model 
that allows for the presence of  irrational investors, or noise traders. Collec- 
tively, these investors swing between being under- and over-optimistic about 
investment opportunities in  particular foreign countries. In this context, the 
discount or premium on a country fund becomes a measure of the spontaneous 
pessimism or optimism with which U.S. investors view the country in question, 
relative to the investors within that same country. 
Moreover, the common component of  country-fund discounts or premia 
across all New York-traded funds becomes an aggregate measure of general 
U.S. sentiment for all foreign countries, relative to local sentiment. A wide- 
spread interpretation  of the specific timing of the 1982  international  debt crisis 
is that domestic investors in such heavily indebted regions as Latin America 
became concerned about future prospects of their countries, and moved large 
amounts of money out, at a time when northern investors were still enthusiasti- 
cally lending. As one observes the renewed surge of capital into less-developed 
countries during the period 1990-93, therefore, one should consider whether 
it is based on a degree of  enthusiasm among northern investors that is not 
shared by the locals, who may be better informed. Hardouvelis, La Porta, and 
Wizman observe a shift from discount to premium in  1990 in the prices of 
many country funds, which they attribute to contagious enthusiasm beginning 
with the fall of  the Berlin Wall. It is interesting to note that discounts have 
particularly diminished or disappeared in Latin America and Central Europe 
since 1990. (In East Asia, on the other hand, premiums have fallen since 1990, 
suggesting that their stock market booms may have been led by domestic in- 
vestors, rather than by foreigners.) One possible interpretation is that discounts 
and premiums are diminishing everywhere as restrictions are removed and the 
markets become more efficient. Another, more troublesome, interpretation is 
that U.S. investors may in 1990 have entered a temporary wave of enthusiasm 
for countries in Latin America and Central Europe. 18  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
In any case, the broadest lesson to be drawn from the country-fund study by 
Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman is the same as that to be drawn from the 
other contributions to this volume. International equity markets offer a wealth 
of new data, unique questions, and useful answers. Empirical studies should 
not merely treat foreign equities as one more asset to be added to the menu of 
investments considered by insular U.S. residents. They should, rather, take due 
account of  the diversity of  assets offered by countries around the world, the 
diversity of  locales in which the universe of  investors live, and the diversity 
of institutional peculiarities that characterize the markets in which assets and 
investors are brought together. 
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